ABSTRACT Crowds are playing an increasingly important role in the research and application of geoscience by providing spatial data via crowdsourcing. However, low-public participation and poor quality of data submissions have greatly restricted the application of spatial crowdsourcing (SC) and other similar models, thus garnering the attention of scientists in this field. In this paper, we design a precise incentive mechanism based on a Bayesian game for SC that successfully avoids the conditions limited by the GibbardSatterthwaite impossibility theorem. Under this mechanism, the outsourcer carries out a Bayesian game with the participants under the circumstance of incomplete information by setting a certain amount of reference information that is not visible to the participants. Participants gain far more utility by telling the truth than that of they gain by lying and thus have a stronger motivation to submit higher-quality data. In implementing this mechanism to automatically compute the actual utility of participants and integrate data results, we propose a geometric primitive matching algorithm based on the Jaccard coefficient. Through both rigorous theoretical analyses and real experiments, the incentive mechanism that we propose is incentive-compatible and can greatly improve data quality.
I. INTRODUCTION
Crowdsourcing, developed in the Web 2.0 environment, is a model by which people contribute their labor and knowledge to a project under the condition of full information sharing. In recent years, spatial crowdsourcing (SC) [1] , which inspires crowds to submit spatial information of true ground targets, has become a topic of great interest in the field of geoscience and has been widely used in land use [2] , [3] , disaster prevention and mitigation [4] , [5] , resource exploration [6] , environmental protection [7] , etc. The United States [8] and the European Union [9] have released citizen observation plans and have implemented several large SC projects. The crowd thus plays an increasingly important role in the research and application of geoscience.
However, the crowdsourcing model is not impeccable, as it can be difficult to encourage crowd participation generally. Crowdsourcing is different from outsourcing, and there is no contractual relationship between the crowd and the outsourcer. Whether the public participates is completely voluntary. Without an incentive, a crowdsourcing plan often can only recruit a very small number of people, a phenomenon referred to by scholars as the 90-9-1 rule [10] or the 1% [11] principle. As a result, participation enthusiasm is diminished, and the crowdsourcing plan cannot be completed within the expected time or at all. Without exception, SC is facing the same problem. Take Tomnod [12] , an SC platform, for example: On 22 September 2017, Puerto Rico, a territory of the United States, was hit by Hurricane Maria, and a crowdsourcing project was launched to encourage people to participate in the visual interpretation of remote sensing images to identify damaged targets such as collapsed houses, damaged roads, and flooded farmland; one year later, however, less than 75% of the tasks were accomplished, and the timeliness of this plan was greatly reduced. For disaster prevention and mitigation, we have also established a crowdsourcing platform for damaged target recognition, but there have been few enthusiastic participants, and the spatial information they have submitted is not satisfactory. Therefore, an SC plan has two core problems to be solved: how to recruit more people involved and how to enhance the motivation of participants to submit high-quality data.
At present, research in this area mostly focuses on participant motivation and data mining algorithms. Researchers consider that people who participate in crowdsourcing must have some internal or external motivation, such as money [13] , [14] , curiosity, occupation, interest, selfactualization [15] , altruism [16] , sincerity, or appeal to knowledge or opinions [17] . The main methods of extracting qualified content from spatial information contributed by the public are the simple voting method, the expectation maximization method [18] , the Bayesian data fusion approach [19] , and the open-source method [20] . These methods can be used only when the information submitted by the participants achieves a certain accuracy. When these methods are used to judge the quality of the data, the outsourcer will give the initiative to the participants, and the participants will be motivated to tell a lie; for example, when using the simple voting method, participants can submit bad information via collusion to obtain rewards and avoid punishment. Clearly, SC faces a dilemma.
Therefore, a good crowdsourcing plan must implement a reasonable incentive mechanism to promote public enthusiasm to participate in it. Many scientists have noted that it is highly important to implement an incentive mechanism in crowdsourcing [13] , [21] , [22] . Under a suitable incentive mechanism whereby participants who submit high-quality information are rewarded and those who submit poor-quality information are punished, participants will be more willing to submit correct information. Otherwise, participants will be more willing to submit incorrect information. At this point, determining which participants should receive more rewards or remuneration requires the outsourcer to determine whether the information submitted by someone is of high or low quality.
Unlike other crowdsourcing scenarios, for which it is easy to judge the convergence point of a task or it is clear whether the task has been completed (such as the project of finding a hot-air balloon [23] ), SC possesses unique characteristics. First, the task is complex. The participants must submit all of geometric information and attribute information correctly, and the outsourcer must correctly check the spatial primitives one by one. Because of the enormous amount of data, the latter is difficult for the outsourcer. Second, SC is a cooperative task [24] that must be accomplished through public cooperation; otherwise, the advantage of crowdsourcing-that is, a large number of people offer a great amount of strengthwill not be brought into play. Therefore, it is necessary to reanalyze the structure of the SC model and design a better incentive mechanism.
Mechanism design is the reverse engineering of game theory [25] , [26] to make a set of rules for a game. Here, we demonstrate a new incentive mechanism based on a Bayesian game (IMBG). By establishing hidden reference information, this scheme creates an incomplete information environment. This Bayesian game between the outsourcer and the participants incentivizes the participants to tell the truth rather than to lie because the expected utility of honesty is much higher than that of deceit. Therefore, the mechanism can not only enhance the enthusiasm of the public but also improve data quality. Furthermore, to implement this mechanism, a geometric primitive matching algorithm based on the Jaccard coefficient [27] (GPMJC) is designed to precisely check and aggregate the results submitted by the crowd automatically. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to design IMBG and GPMJC algorithms for improving the data quality of SC.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: In the second section, we summarize work related to mechanism design. In Section III, we illustrate the IMBG for SC and demonstrate its rationality. In Section IV, we elaborate the GPMJC algorithm, which is used to judge whether participants have submitted high-or low-quality data. In Section V, we obtain a real data set through an SC project and validate the effectiveness of the IMBG based on these data, including the degree of participation and the accuracy of the results. Finally, Section VI concludes this article.
II. RELATED WORK
The public will actively participate in crowdsourcing projects only if they are motivated by material or psychological factors. Paying rewards often involves problems such as privacy leakage and distrust. Determining how to pay rewards reasonably comprises the incentive mechanism. In recent years, proposed crowdsourcing incentive mechanisms have mainly fallen into the following categories. 1) Game-theorybased mechanisms. For example, Yang et al. [28] designed an incentive mechanism using a Stackelberg game to maximize the utility of the platform when the platform is the leader while the users are the followers. Li et al. [29] proposed two incentive mechanisms to stimulate mobile users to contribute indoor trajectory data for crowdsourcing-based indoor localization with differential privacy to prevent mobile users' privacy leakage based on a two-stage Stackelberg game. Wu et al. [30] designed a Stackelberg-game-based mechanism by which the requester fixes a certain total payment to encourage participants to participate in a task. 2) Auctionbased mechanisms. For example, to solve the problem that users should be selected as sensors in each time slot, aiming to maximize social welfare and ensure the long-term participation incentive of users, Gao et al. [31] proposed a Lyapunov-based VCG auction policy for on-line sensor selection. Additionally, Yang et al. [28] proposed an auctionbased incentive mechanism that is computationally efficient, individually rational, profitable, and truthful. For a specific task that is budget-constrained and requires one or more skills, Zhang et al. [32] proposed a solution based on reverse auction theory, assigning tasks to competent people and preventing false quotations. Zhu et al. [33] proposed an incentive mechanism based on reverse auctions and Vickrey auctions to prevent malicious competition behavior and the VOLUME 7, 2019 ''free-riding'' phenomenon in crowdsourcing services. Zhang et al. [34] designed a truthful auction with countermeasures against false-name attacks as an auction-based incentive mechanism for crowdsourcing. Li et al. [35] proposed a randomized combinatorial auction mechanism for the social cost minimization problem. Luo et al. [36] designed an incentive mechanism for scenarios involving heterogeneous types of workers (and the beliefs about their respective types) using an asymmetric all-pay contest (or auction) model. 3) Contracttheory-based mechanisms. For example, Zhang et al. [37] analyzed the typical contract problems of adverse selection and moral hazard and indicated that contract theory is a useful framework for motivating the third party's participation in emerging wireless networks of multimedia and locationbased mobile services. In addition, incentive mechanisms other than the three categories mentioned above have been proposed. For example, Zhang et al. [38] designed a crowdsourcing tournament to maximize the principal's utility in crowdsourcing and provide continuous incentives for users by rewarding them based on the rank they achieved.
In this paper, we are more concerned about the quality of the data participants submit. Dai et al. [39] proposed an integrated incentive mechanism that utilized reverse auction, gamification, and reputation updating to incentivize crowds to actively participate and provide high-quality sensing data. In addition, incentive mechanisms proposed by researchers to improve data quality are as follows: determining data quality through users' reputation history [40] , [41] , evaluating data quality through behavioral representations associated with users [42] , [40] , improving data quality by an expectation maximization algorithm [43] , using participant confidence to measure the quality of data generated [44] , assessing data quality based on the past experience of mobile users [45] , etc.
However, when the result set is finite and contains at least three elements, each participant's preference covers all strict total preference relations on the result set, and the social choice function is full projection, the Gibbard-Satterthwaite impossibility theorem shows that the social choice function is incentive-compatible for the dominant strategy only if it is dictatorial [46] , [47] . Therefore, there are loopholes in the application of the abovementioned incentive mechanism to SC. Malicious participants can use these loopholes to maximize their utility. Therefore, the abovementioned incentive mechanisms can hardly be applied to SC systems.
Unlike macrotasking crowdsourcing [48] , SC is microtasking crowdsourcing that requires the cooperation of many participants. In this scenario, designing a Bayesian game to motivate participants to submit real information about true ground targets can avoid the conditions defined by the Gibbard-Satterthwaite impossibility theorem. Because the expected utility of honesty is much higher than that of deceit, the approach is incentive-compatible.
The 9-Intersection Model (9IM), a topological model proposed by Egenhofer [49] - [52] and developed by Clementini et al. [53] , [54] used to perform spatial analysis, has become the standard for describing the spatial relations of two geometries in two dimensions. This model specifies very strictly that two geometries are topologically equal if their interiors intersect and no part of the interior or boundary of one geometry intersects the exterior of the other. Based on this model, when the difference between two polygons using the Boolean operation NOT is zero, two geometric primitives are deemed to coincide with each other [55] - [58] . However, deviations caused by operation, instruments or computer systems are inevitable in practical spatial information projects; therefore, we cannot use these methods to determine whether two geometric primitives coincide with each other when these deviations must be tolerated.
We propose a geometric primitive matching algorithm based on the theory of the Jaccard coefficient, defined as intersection over union over the range of [0, 1], which can express the degree of overlap between two geometric primitives.
For clarity, Table 1 lists the parameters and their meanings, as used in this paper.
III. INCENTIVE MECHANISM BASED ON BAYESIAN GAME
Suppose that an outsourcer wants to obtain spatial information about certain types of ground objects in one geographic area and encourages public participation with certain types of incentives; we make the strategic choices of the participants and the outsourcer independent under this mechanism. Because the conditional probabilities of each strategy are equal to each other, this scenario is a Bayesian game. The IMBG consists of the following modules, as shown in Fig 1. 1) According to their consideration, each participant extracts the spatial information of a certain number objects as a game strategy.
2) The outsourcer randomly chooses a certain number objects in the region, obtains their correct spatial information as seed primitives, and takes these seed primitives as a game strategy to participate in the game.
3) The outsourcer gives each participant a reward calculated by the GPMJC algorithm. 4) Data integration is carried out according to the correct rate of each participant in the game process. 5) The system generates thematic maps and delivers them to the outsourcer.
A. TRADE BETWEEN OUTSOURCER AND PARTICIPANT
The task of a cyber-citizen participating in SC is to provide spatial information of earth surface targets to the outsourcer. The spatial information of ground objects includes two parts: geometric and attribute information. Geometric information is represented by geometric figures such as points, lines, and polygons formed by spatial positions, and attribute information is represented by descriptive information such as words and numerical values.
In an SC project, there is no contractual relationship between the outsourcer and the participant, but the two are gaming. Through the game, each party adopts a certain strategy to interact with the other to maximize its utility.
We can describe the game model as follows: Suppose that participant p submits his or her results
, where o pi represents one of the geographic information primitives and N p represents the number of primitives in S p . If o pi is correct, participant p gains utility u c ; now, set T pi = 1. If o pi is incorrect, participant p gains utility u e ; now, set T pi = 0. The utility obtained by participant p is synthesized into the following expression:
The wrong primitives are without meaning to the outsourcer; that is, the latter part of the formula is negative for the outsourcer such that the outsourcer's utility is as follows:
The outsourcer and the participants are all rational decisionmakers-one of the basic conditions of game theory [59] ; therefore, they are consistently able to find the best strategy to maximize their utility. However, the strategy may not necessarily be their true type, and they may also tell a lie. For example, the participants can adjust the number of correct and erroneous primitives according to rules of the game. We hope that both the outsourcer and the participant can achieve their highest expectations, namely, incentive compatibility [25] or Pareto efficiency [60] . Therefore, we must design a reasonable mechanism to induce participants to tell the truth. The core of mechanism design is the social choice function, which is the combination of a series of rules in a game [61] . Thus, when using the abovementioned simple voting method, expectation maximization method, Bayesian data fusion approach, or open-source method as the social choice function, participants can find a dictatorial dominant strategy to deceive the outsourcer. If the condition of the game is relaxed to be Bayesian-incentive-compatible, the restriction of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite impossibility theorem can be avoided. When the game reaches equilibrium, the result submitted by the participants is exactly the reaction of their true type.
B. INCENTIVE MECHANISM DESIGN
For SC, the Bayesian incentive mechanism contains two elements: indirect revelation mechanisms and Bayesian incentive compatibility. Suppose the outsourcer wants to obtain the spatial information of T ground objects in an area; that is, O = {o t |1 ≤ t ≤ T }. Thus, we can design the incentive mechanism as follows:
1. The two parties of the game are the outsourcer os and one participant p.
2. Outsourcer os selects a certain number T seed (T seed < T ) of ground objects in O and obtains absolutely accurate spatial information about them to create seeds set O seed . O seed constitutes one of his or her possible strategies. All possible seeds sets form his or her strategies set; that is, S os = {O seed |O seed ⊂ O}, where O seed , which has
T seed T possibilities, is one subset of O. Generally, O seed accounts for a small proportion of O as a reference set [62] , [63] . Outsourcer os randomly arranges the seeds that are invisible to the participants and thus creates an incomplete VOLUME 7, 2019 information environment, which is the basis of the Bayesian game.
3. The candidate strategies set of participant p is all the possible results that he or she can submit; that is,
where function C (·) returns the primitives that coincide with corresponding seeds and function C − (·) returns the primitives that intersect with some seeds but that are not congruent. The utility that participant p gains from the outsourcer is
As shown in Fig. 2 , there are 15 ground targets in one geographic area. The outsourcer selects 5 randomly and obtains their absolutely accurate spatial information. One participant submits spatial information pertaining to 9 targets. Comparing the spatial information of the two sides, 2 primitives are correct and 1 is incorrect. Thus, the utility gained by this participant is 2u c − u e .
C. INCENTIVE COMPATIBILITY
One reasonable incentive mechanism is incentive compatibility. We analyze and clarify the incentive compatibility of the mechanism in three respects: the basic principle, the maximization of utility and the risk participants take. 1. Outsourcer os and participant p are independent when choosing strategies in the abovementioned game; therefore, the joint probability of choosing their strategies separately is
The belief function of outsourcer os can be solved by Bayes formula as follows: Similarly, the belief function of participant p can be solved by
Thus, the mechanism satisfies the basic conditions of the Bayesian game, that is, belief consistency. When M c + T seed ≤ T , the number of primitives that coincide with the seeds M 1 c obeys a hypergeometric distribution; that is, M 1 c ∼ H (T , M c , T seed ). therefore, the probability
where M 1 c = 0, 1, 2, 3, . . . , min(M 1 c , T seed ) and its expectation is
Therefore, the expected utility U p of participant p is a function of M c , as follows: When M c + T seed > T , there are at least M c + T seed − T primitives coinciding with the seeds, and M c +T seed −T is not easily expressed by hypergeometric distribution. However, the number of seeds M 0 c that are not hit by the result submitted by participant p obeys a hypergeometric distribution; that is,
. Therefore, the probability
where M 0 c = 0, 1, 2, 3, . . . , min(M 0 c , T seed ) and its expectation
The expected utility not attained by participant p is
Therefore, the expected utility that participant p obtains is the total utility u c ×T seed minus the utility U p (T − M c ) he or she did not receive:
Regardless of whether M c + T seed ≤ T or M c + T seed > T , the expected utility is always a function of M c . Similarly, if there are M e erroneous primitives in the result submitted by participant p and M 1 e primitives hit the seed, then the negative expected utility obtained by the participant is
Thus, the total utility participant p gains is
U p is clearly a monotonic, linearly increasing function of M c − M e , where 0 ≤ M c ≤ T , M e ≥ 0. U p reaches its maximum only when M c = T and M e = 0; that is, the only Nash equilibrium in the game is that participant p submits the T primitives of earth surface targets correctly. 3. We use the variance to calculate the risk of participants and consider the two situations M c + T seed ≤ T and M c + T seed > T comprehensively. The support of the stochastic variable M 1 c , which obeys a hypergeometric distribution, is {max(0,M c + T seed − T ), min(M c , T seed )}. The variance can be calculated by
The derivation function of
Setting
c reaches a minimum value of 0. As shown in Fig. 3 , we set T = 100 and T seed = 10; the risk a participant p takes increases with the number of correct results he or she submits, reaching a maximum of 2.27 at M c = 50 and then decreasing to 0 at M c = 100. This finding suggests that participants take the lowest risk in two situations: not participating in crowdsourcing tasks or submitting completely correct results.
The analysis above indicates that participants must submit more accurate results if they want to gain more utility and decrease their risk; furthermore, receiving more highquality data yields the highest outsourcer utility. Therefore, the incentive mechanism we propose is incentive-compatible. If the utility paid by the outsourcer constitutes a sufficiently large incentive, the participants have sufficient motivation to complete the crowdsourcing task with high-quality data.
IV. GEOMETRIC PRIMITIVES MATCHING AND DATA AGGREGATION ALGORITHM
One key to implementing the abovementioned incentive mechanism is to decide which primitive completely coincides with one seed. Manual processing of these data is unrealistic. Thus, we need machine automation.
A. GEOMETRIC PRIMITIVES MATCHING ALGORITHM BASED ON JACCARD COEFFICIENT
The Jaccard similarity coefficient, which is defined as the size of the intersection divided by the size of the union of two sample sets, is an excellent algorithm for measuring the VOLUME 7, 2019 similarity of two sets of discrete samples. With the increase in intersection, the degree of similarity of the two sets increases. Based on the same principle, the overlap degree of two polygons increases with the increase in their intersection area. We redefine the Jaccard coefficient expression to calculate the degree of overlap of two geometries as follows:
where function area (·) represents the area of the corresponding variable. The expression represents the value of the overlapping area of the two polygons A and B divided by their merged area. Whether a polygonal primitive submitted by someone and a seed polygonal primitive are congruent can be directly judged by the Jaccard coefficient. If the Jaccard coefficient is close to 1, the polygonal primitives are judged as congruent; otherwise, they are not. However, when the area of each of the two primitives is very large, even if the boundary of the two primitives deviates greatly, the Jaccard coefficient is still very close to 1. As shown in Fig. 4 , the Jaccard coefficient of polygons A and B is 0.934. However, if we establish a buffer zone with a threshold θ for A and B based on the boundary, the Jaccard coefficient of their buffer polygons will clearly be less than 1. For example, J (A, B) is only 0.239 when θ = 0.3, far less than 1, as shown in Fig. 5 . If polygon A has flying points, the Jaccard coefficient of A and B is 0.982, very close to 1, as shown in Fig. 6 . Additionally, if we create buffers for A and B based on the boundary, the Jaccard coefficient of their buffer polygons is 0.237, far less than 1, when θ = 0.3, as shown in Fig. 7 . Therefore, calculating the Jaccard coefficient based on the buffer zone of the boundary of the two geometric primitives alone can precisely indicate whether the two coincide with each other. The buffer polygon of A and B in (19) should be calculated as follows:
where function buffer (·) represents the outward buffer of a polygon X with a positive or, inward, negative value. Thus, the Jaccard coefficient expression used to compare two geometrical primitives is
J (A, B) is dimensionless with a range of [0, 1]. The results of numerical simulation show that the buffer radius θ is positively correlated with J (A, B) . The smaller the value of θ is, the smaller J (A, B) becomes. The buffer radius θ of two polygons should be set according to the actual accuracy requirements of real projects. The higher the accuracy requirements are, the smaller the buffer radius and the greater J (A, B) become. For projects that need to detect point and line targets, we can still establish a buffer for each of the primitives to use this algorithm to judge the degree of overlap of point and line primitives. 
B. DATA AGGREGATION ALGORITHM
When all participants submit their results, that is, when they each individually complete the game with the outsourcer, we must filter the results submitted by each participant and extract the highest-quality primitives for the outsourcer. If the results submitted by participant p have M 1 c primitives correct and M 1 e incorrect, then the accuracy of participant p can be estimated by
where the range of
Accuracy A p is a measure of the credibility of the results submitted by participant p, which is directly proportional to the actual utility of the participants and inversely proportional to the number of primitives that intersect with the seeds. When the accuracy of participants is relatively high, this formula allows for suitable evaluation of the quality of data submitted by participants. When the quality of the submission is relatively low, the following expression can be used:
At this point, the accuracy is inversely proportional to the total number of elements drawn by a participant; thus, a participant is prevented from submitting a large number of inferior data to gain higher utility. When the information pertaining to a ground target is submitted by multiple participants, the primitive of this target that belongs to the participant whose accuracy is the highest will be selected according to Algorithm 1.
V. EXPERIMENTS
To verify the effectiveness of the incentive mechanism based on the Bayesian game, we chose part of the Qinghai-Tibet Plateau in China as the test area. We developed and deployed a WebGIS-based SC platform using Geoserver and OpenLayers, which are open-source platforms for participants to perform interpretation work. Lakes in this area are less affected by human activities than in other areas and have obvious interpretable characteristics on Landsat 8 images, the ground resolution of which is 30 meters. The study region contains 1678 lakes and 87 lake islands. With natural lakes as the targets, we carried out an accurate interpretation of the entire study area and selected 109 primitives, approximately 5% of all primitives, as seeds. We used money to incentivize the public to participate in this SC. The award rules served as the incentive mechanism we designed. We promised the public 109 targets set as seeds randomly and assigned 10 CNY to each seed; that is, u c = 10 CNY , u e = 10 CNY . The maximum benefit of one participant was 1,090 CNY . Because the ground resolution of Landsat 8 images is low, there is an uncertain transitional zone of approximately 60 meters between water and land in the images. We set the buffer radius 60 m, which equals the width of 2 pixels in the Landsat 8 images. If the Jaccard coefficient of a primitive drawn by one participant and one seed primitive is greater than 0.333, a validated threshold in this experiment, the primitive is judged to be correct, and the participant can gain the money associated with this seed. Then, we announced the task to the public on multiple social media platforms. Three days later, we received 4921 primitives submitted by 38 participants. Fig. 8 shows the 4796 primitives submitted by the top 20 participants who submitted the most. The number of primitives belonging to each participant is listed in Table 2 . The number of results submitted by other participants was too small; therefore, we did not analyze their submissions.
The distribution of the number of elements submitted by participants is close to the linear distribution under the incentive mechanism, indicating that the result has broken through the 90-9-1 or 1% rule. 
A. UTILITY ANALYSIS
We compared the result data submitted by each participant and the primitives precisely interpreted by the GPMJC algorithm, the results of which are explained in detail in Section IV. Then, the number of correct primitives M c , the number of misinterpreted primitives M e , the number of correct primitives coinciding with the seed M 1 c , and the number of misinterpreted primitives intersecting with the seeds but that were incorrect M 1 e were obtained. For example, participant P_1 submitted 973 primitives, among which 47 primitives intersected with the seeds, including 43 correct and 4 incorrect primitives. The details of the 20 participants who submitted the most primitives are shown in Table 2 . The strategy adopted by the outsourcer was that the seed primitives were invisible to every participant in the Bayesian game. For every participant, the expected utility was a monotonic, linearly increasing function of M c − M e (Fig. 9) according to (22) , and the actual utility was a monotonic, linearly increasing function of M 1 c − M 1 e . The expected utilities EU and actual utilities AU were not related to the number of seed primitives set by the outsourcer. M 1 c and M 1 e all obeyed a hypergeometric distribution and correlated positively with the number of correct primitives M c and the number of incorrect primitives M e separately. The seed primitives were set randomly such that the actual utility of each participant had a slight degree of fluctuation compared with the expected utility; however, the actual utility and M c − M e showed a high degree of positive correlation (Fig. 10) . In summary, each participant could achieve greater utility only if he or she submitted more correct results and as few incorrect results as possible to increase M c − M e . Taking participant P_1 as an example, 973 primitives were submitted-840 correct, 133 incorrect; therefore, the expected utility was 436.62, calculated by 10 × (840 − 133) × 109/1765, and the actual utility was 390, calculated by 10 × (43 − 4) . Correspondingly, 81 primitives were submitted by participant VOLUME 7, 2019 P_10-30 correct, 51 incorrect; therefore, the expected utility was −12.97, calculated by 10 × (30 − 51) × 109/1765, and the actual utility was 0, calculated by 10 × (2 − 6) as 0 when the value is less than 0.
All the expected and actual utilities of the top 20 participants are shown in Table 2 . Without the Bayesian game-based incentive mechanism, we can only consider all 4796 primitives correct, and the expected costs is 2961.8 CNY , calculated by 4796×109/1765×10. However, when the filter rules in this mechanism were used, bad primitives were wiped out. Finally, the total expected utility was 2128.74 CNY , and the cost we paid was 2120 CNY .
B. DATA AGGREGATION
We calculated the accuracy using (22) for every participant, as shown in Table 3 . For example, among primitives submitted by participant P_1, the number that fully coincided with seed primitives M 1 c , i.e., the number of correct primitives, was 43; furthermore, those that incompletely coincided with seed primitives M 1 e , i.e., the number of incorrect primitives, was 4. Thus, the accuracy A p of participant P_1 was 82.97%, according to (22) . The higher the accuracy is, the greater the likelihood that the primitives of one participant will be correct become. If multiple participants submitted primitives of one ground target, the outsourcer should select the one submitted by the participant with the highest accuracy A p .
When a lake or islet is interpreted by multiple participants, the primitive of this target that belongs to the participant whose accuracy is the highest will be selected according to Algorithm 1. Take the largest primitive in Fig. 8 as an example. Five participants (P_1, P_3, P_5, P_10, and P_13) interpreted the lake target (Fig. 11) . Among those participants, P_1 had the highest accuracy. Therefore, the primitive submitted by P_1 was selected, and the others were discarded.
The numbers of primitives selected and abandoned by every participant are shown in Table 3 . For example, 227 primitives of participant P_1 were adopted, and 746 were abandoned. Ultimately, 1661 primitives submitted by 16 participants were preserved, including 1602 lakes and 59 islands. If a lake primitive contained islands, we used the island primitive to clip the lake primitive and then obtained the real lake primitive without small patches of land. After subtracting island primitives from lake primitives, we obtained the actual lake distribution map (Fig. 12) . The total accuracy of this SC project was 95.3%.
VI. CONCLUSION
For SC projects, an incentive mechanism must be implemented to recruit a large number of participants to complete tasks in a reasonable time. Many studies on crowdsourcing projects have been carried out, and several incentive mechanisms have been proposed. However, through the GibbardSatterthwaite impossibility theorem, we find that there are some loopholes in the application of these incentive mechanisms in SC projects involving micro tasks. With these incentive mechanisms, because people have the motivation to lie, the quality of data is not guaranteed. In this study, we designed a Bayesian game-based incentive mechanism with spatial data as the core. In the Bayesian game, because of the hidden reference information, the participants were deprived of the possibility of implementing a dictatorial strategy through collusion or other means. The expected utility that participants gain through honesty is much higher than that gained through deceit. The only Nash equilibrium existing in the mechanism theoretically is that participants submit accurate spatial information. In addition, in implementing this mechanism, we proposed the GPMJC algorithm based on the Jaccard coefficient, which can automatically compare geometric primitives, calculate the utility of participants, evaluate the quality of data results, and integrate data. Finally, the experiment proved that the IMBG is incentivecompatible and can significantly improve the data quality of SC projects. It should be noted that the value of the utility set in the experiment is determined by our assessment of the current average wage level in China. Clearly, as the bonus increases, more participants will participate in this SC project. However, when the bonus is too high, a certain degree of resource waste will arise. A method for finding the best balance, auction or public bidding may be a good solution. Our future work will involve the development of such a method.
